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REDLARK V. COMMISSIONER: A "BiRD IN THE HAND"
FOR NONCORPORATE TAXPAYERS?

INThoDUCrION

Before the Tax Reform Act of 1986, individual taxpayers
could generally deduct interest regardless of whether the underlying
indebtedness was considered personal or business-related. However,
Internal Revenue Code ("I.R.C.") § 163(h)(1), added by the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, denies interest deductions for "personal interest."' "Personal interest" is defined negatively in that section; an
exception preserves the deductibility of interest "on indebtedness
properly allocable to a trade or business."2 Upon the enactment of
I.R.C. § 163(h) the IRS took the position, via temporary treasury
regulations, that all interest accruing on underpayments of individual income tax is personal and therefore nondeductible.3 While the

1.I.R.C. § 163(h)(1) (1994) ("In the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation, no
deduction shall be allowed under this chapter for personal interest paid or accrued during
the taxable year.").
2. I.R.C. § 163(h)(2) (1994) (as amended by Section 1005(c)(4) of the Technical and
Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, P.L. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342, 3390). As originally
enacted in 1986, I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(A) read "interest paid or accrued on indebtedness
incurred or continued in connection with the conduct of a trade or business." See infra
notes 226-228 and accompanying text (discussing the failure of Congress to consider the
applicable regulations when modifying the underlying statute). Treasury regulations generally define amounts that are considered "properly allocable" under the amended language.
See, e.g., Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-8T(c) (1987) (discussing "[a]llocation of debt and
interest expense").
3. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-9T(b)(2)(i)(A) (1987). The temporary regulation states:
Interest relating to taxes--i) In general. Except as provided in paragraph
(b)(2)(iii) of this section, personal interest includes interest-(A) Paid on
underpayments of individual Federal, State or local income taxes and on indebtedness used to pay such taxes (within the meaning of § 1.163-8T), regardless
of the source of the income generating the tax liability.
Id.at § 1.163-9T(b)(2) (emphasis added). The exception noted for paragraph (b)(2)(iii)
provides that personal interest does not include interest
(A) Paid with respect to sales, excise and similar taxes that are incurred in
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temporary regulation effectively denies individuals a deduction for
interest on all income tax deficiencies (even when the source of
income is a trade or business), the statute permits the deduction of
"business interest" generally. The proper treatment of deficiency
interest attributable to changes in individual tax liability arising
from a trade or business is therefore unclear.
The issue of whether the temporary regulation has erroneously
interpreted the statute seems destined to split the circuits. In 1995,
the Eighth Circuit validated the regulation in Miller v. United

States.4 Earlier this year, however, in a case of first impression,
the Tax Court invalidated the regulation in Redlark v. Commissioner.5 Redlark was a sharply divided decision; while the dissenting
and majority opinions each gained the support of eight judges, the
majority opinion was joined by three judges who concurred in the
result.6 Not surprisingly, the IRS has appealed Redlark.' If the
Ninth Circuit affirms the Tax Court, as is expected,' the final resconnection with a trade or business or an investment activity; (B) Paid by an S
corporation with respect to an underpayment of income tax from a year in
which the S corporation was a C corporation . . . ; or (C) Paid by a transferee... (tax liability resulting from transferred assets) ... with respect to a C
corporation's underpayment of income tax.
L at § 1.163-9T(b)(2)(iii). See infra notes 198-208 and accompanying text (discussing
these exceptions within the context of legislative history). Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-8T
provides a general framework for allocating interest based on expenditures or uses of debt
proceeds. See infra notes 171-86 and accompanying text (discussing that section specifically and the interplay between the sections of the regulation).
4. 65 F.3d 687, 690 (8th Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Miller 111](holding that the regulation was a "reasonable interpretation of legislative intent"), affg 95-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
rev'g 841 F.Supp. 305
(CCH) ( 50,068, 87,228 (D.N.D. 1994) [hereinafter Miller 11],
(D.N.D. 1993) [hereinafter Miller 1].
5. 106 T.C. 31, 47 (1996) (holding that the regulation was "an impermissible reading
of the statute").
6. The court-reviewed decision consisted of a majority opinion authored by Senior
Judge Tannenwald, two concurring opinions (Judges Swift and Laro), and two dissenting
opinions (Judges Ruwe and Halpern). Seven judges agreed with the majority opinion and
one concurred in the result only. Two judges agreed with Swift's concurrence and four
judges agreed with Laro's concurrence. Six judges agreed with one or both of the dissenting opinions.
7. See Report on Tax Court Cases on Appeal, TAX NOTES TODAY (May 22, 1996),
available in LEXIS, 96 TNT 116-58.
8. See William L. Raby & Burgess J.W. Raby, Allocating Individual Tax Deficiency
Interest, 70 TAX NoTEs 573, 574 (1996) (noting that the Ninth Circuit is expected to
affirm the Tax Court). Cf.Lee A Sheppard, The Consumption Tax: Personal vs. Business,
70 TAX NOTEs 641, 641 (noting that the last time the Ninth Circuit addressed an "easy
question" about the interest deduction it "showed division, vacillation, and little appreciation of the code's overall structure before finally getting the right answer for the wrong
reason"). This comment was in reference to Albertson's Inc. v Commissioner, 12 F.3d
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olution of this issue may be left to the Supreme Court.
An analysis of the Redlark decision is important for a number
of reasons. First, because a large proportion of all small businesses
are conducted as sole proprietorships, many taxpayers may be
affected by its outcome. 9 Second, and perhaps most important,
Redlark is fascinating because so many members of the Tax Court
seem unable to agree about (1) whether the statute is ambiguous,
(2) whether the related legislative history is ambiguous, and (3)
what weight to give legislative history in interpreting the statute."
For example, while the majority opinion emphasized the effect of
existing judicial interpretations in interpreting the statute, the dissenting opinions (echoing the majority opinion in Miller III) emphasized the regulatory authority of the IRS." The differences in
the Redlark opinions also serve to illustrate the tension between the
relative importance of plain meaning and legislative history in
statutory construction and the sometimes conflicting goals of discerning the most equitable or correct interpretation of the statute
versus the need for efficiency and consistency in administration.
Third, at its core, the deductibility of individual deficiency interest
illustrates the difficulty of developing rules that distinguish between
personal and business expenditures. This is a longstanding problem
that is, or should be, of particular concern in many of the current
proposals for tax reform (e.g., a consumption-type tax). 2 Perhaps
in part because of these underlying philosophical issues, commentators are polarized over the outcome in Redlark; while some agree

1529 (9th Cir. 1993) (dealing more generally with the characterization of "interest' on
deferred compensation). See Sheppard, 70 TAx NoTEs at 641.
9. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 104th CONG., 2D SESS., IMPACT ON SMALL
BusINEss OF REPLACING THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 51 (Comm. Print 1996) (noting that,
based on data from the IRS' Statistics of Income regarding the number of returns filed by
different forms of business organizations from 1978 to 1993, nonfarm sole proprietorships
made up nearly 75% of all businesses in 1993, and were never less than 69% of the
total in any of the 16 years reviewed).
10. See generally, Richard M. Lipton, Divided Tax Court Allows Deduction of Interest
on Tax Arising From a Trade or Business, J. OF TAX'N, Apr. 1996, at 218.
11. See id. at 222.
12. See generally, Sheppard, supra note 8, at 641. Nevertheless, the dissension among
the Tax Court judges in Redlark will likely be fuel for the fire for those who argue that
the complexity of the current Code makes a complete overhaul, or a switch to a different
system, necessary for effective tax reform. And indeed, if supposedly expert Tax Court
judges have so much trouble arriving at the correct interpretation of the law, perhaps "[ilt
is time to uproot the current disgraceful system and replace it with a clear, simple tax
code." J. Kenneth Blackwell, There's Nothing EZ About IRS Forms, WALt. ST. J., Apr.
16, 1996, at A14 (The author, the Treasurer of Ohio, was a member of the National
Commission on Economic Growth and Tax Reform chaired by Jack Kemp.).
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that the Tax Court reached the correct conclusion, 3 others believe
that it was an "ill-considered decision."'1 4 Finally, the Redlark
holding may also apply in cases where deficiencies have arisen as
a result of individual investment and passive activities.
One of the principal reasons for the Redlark majority's invalidation of the regulation was its deference to a body of pre-1987
case law that allowed the deduction of interest accruing on business-related tax deficiencies. 5 Therefore, Part I of this Comment
analyzes some of the more important cases leading up to Redlark.
The majority's reliance on pre-1987 case law is but one facet of
the majority's method of statutory interpretation, however. Its standard of review in examining the regulation, as well as its view of
legislative history are also important pieces of the foundation of
the decision. Therefore, Part I discusses various methods of interpretation used in the decision. Part I proposes that underlying
philosophical issues were also significant contributing factors in the
disjointed opinions within the Redlark decision. Part III presents an
example of one of the more important implications of invalidating
the regulation.
I. THE PATH TO REDLARK: CASE LAW PRECEDENT

In Redlark, Judge Tannenwald, writing for the majority, noted
that any decision regarding the validity of the temporary regulations must be preceded by a determination of whether the interest
in question could meet the statutory exception of I.R.C. §
163(h)(2)(A). 6 While that section carves out an exception to the
nondeductibility of personal interest for interest on indebtedness
"properly allocable to a trade or business," this phrase is not defined within the statute. The Redlark majority reasoned that if
interest constituted a business expense within the meaning of I.R.C.
§ 162(a) (and I.R.C. § 62(a)), it could, "as a result.., be charac-

13. See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 10, at 222 (noting that the court reached the correct
conclusion based on the reasoning presented by the concurring judges-a "plain language"
interpretation of the statute).
14. See, e.g., Sheppard, supra note 8, at 641.
15. See infra notes 21-61 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's rationale
for interpretation of the pre-1987 case law).
16. See Redlark, 106 T.C. at 33 ("Before proceeding to a determination of the effect
of pertinent regulations, we must first consider whether the interest expense involved
herein is sufficiently connected to the business [of the taxpayer] so as to satisfy the
'properly allocable to a trade or business' exception of section 163(h)(2)(A), without regard to the regulations.").
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terized as interest 'on indebtedness properly allocable to a trade or
business' within the meaning of I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(A)."17 The
District Court in Miller I also relied on definitions of business
interest under I.R.C. §§ 162 and 62 in defining the "properly allocable" phrase of I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(A).Y It reasoned that because
the language used in "new" I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(A) closely tracked
the language of I.R.C. §§ 162(a) and 62(a) (which were not
amended), and because the courts had consistently held deficiency
interest deductible under those sections, it could now rely on the
precept that, absent evidence of contrary legislative intent, "the
legislature is presumed to have approved of a statute's judicial
construction when that provision is reenacted in the same or substantially the same language."' 9 Indeed, the Redlark majority also
went on to note that a review of cases decided before I.R.C. §
163(h)(2)(A), but involving "the deductibility of interest on income
tax deficiencies as a business expense, will throw light on this
question and is therefore a significant element in our analysis of
the impact of that section on petitioners' claimed interest deduction."
A. Deficiency Interest as an Ordinary and Necessary
Trade or Business Expense: Pre-1987 Case Law
While the phrase "ordinary and necessary" is also not defined
statutorily, there is an extensive body of case law establishing its
general definition.2 ' Pre-1987 cases specifically addressing deficiency interest suggest that the definition of "ordinary and necessary" is drawn narrowly for that particular expense. The Redlark
majority reviewed three principal pre-1987 cases in making its
determination that deficiency interest was indeed previously deduct-

17. Id.at 34. Section 162 allows the deduction of "all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business."
I.R.C. § 162(a) (1994). Section 62 then specifies that such trade or business deductions
are taken into account in determining a taxpayer's adjusted gross income. I.R.C. §
62(a)(1) (1994) ("'[Aidiusted gross income' means, in the case of an individual, gross
income minus ... deductions allowed by this chapter... which are attributable to a
trade or business carried on by the taxpayer.").
18. See Miller I, 841 F.Supp. at 309 (referring to the original incarnation of LR.C. §
163(h)(2)(A)).
19. Id.
20. Redlark 106 T.C. at 34-35.
21. See, e.g., Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113-14 (1933) (defining "ordinary" as

variable and "affected by time and place and circumstance," and "necessary" by whether
the expense is appropriate and helpful to the taxpayer's business).
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ible under the more general rules, at least in certain circumstances.
Standing v. Commissioner' decided by the Tax Court in 1957,
was one of the first cases involving the deductibility of interest on
tax deficienciessa The underlying tax adjustments in Standing
were clearly attributable to the taxpayers' lumber business, which
was conducted as a sole proprietorship.' In Standing, the Tax
Court compared deficiency interest to legal expenses incurred by
the taxpayer (which are deductible as business expenses) noting:
"[W]e are unable to perceive any real distinction between an expenditure for attorney's fees made to secure payment of the earnings of the business and a like expenditure to retain such earnings
after their receipt."'
Relying on its holding in Standing, the Tax Court in Polk v.
Commissioner' held shortly thereafter that interest on a tax deficiency arising from an adjustment to the valuation of inventories
was deductible as an ordinary and necessary business expense.'
In affirming Polk, however, the Tenth Circuit made several comments suggesting that, instead of being analogous, as was held in
Standing, the deductibility of deficiency interest as a business expense should be more limited than attorneys' fees.' For example,
the court found that attorneys' fees in defense of litigation against
a taxpayer are "ordinary" because "such litigation results in numerous instances and is to be expected." 9 However, "the same cannot
be said, as a matter of course, of penalty interest." ° In the latter
instance, whether or not interest expenses qualify depends on the
"peculiar facts" of each case." The court summarized the difference as "[tihe field, within which it can be said that penalty interest on a deficiency assessment of taxes against a taxpayer, charged
with the duty of filing a correct return, constitutes an ordinary and

22.
23.
24.
tional
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

28 T.C. 789 (1957), affd, 259 F.2d 450 (4th Cir. 1958).
Id.
Standing, 28 T.C. at 790 (noting that the revenue agent's report said "[tihe additax is due to increase in business income").
Id. at 794 (quoting Kornhouser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145, 153 (1928)).
31 T.C. 412 (1958), affd, 276 F.2d 601 (10th Cir. 1960).
See Polk, 31 T.C. at 415.
See Commissioner v. Polk, 276 F.2d 601, 603-04 (10th Cir. 1960).
Id. at 603.
Id.
Id.
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necessary expense arising out of the operation of the business, is
much narrower than in the case of attorneys' fees." 32
Polk is something of an anomaly because the inventory to be
valued consisted of livestock, which the affirming appellate court
admitted was inherently difficult to value.33 While allowing the
deduction, the Polk Court warned that interest is not deductible as
a business expense "merely because it [arises] in connection with
the taxpayer's business and [is] proximately related thereto. 34
Further, "[u]nless it can be said that the failure to properly evaluate
inventories, which form a part of a taxpayer's return, arises because of the nature of the business, and is ordinarily and necessarily to be expected, interest on a deficiency assessment does not
arise out of the ordinary operation of the business and may not be
'
Therefore, while Polk is cited by the majority in
deducted."35
Redlark in support of the conclusion that there was a consistent
body of pre-1987 case law allowing deficiency interest deductions,
suggest that many
a strict interpretation of the Polk holding3 would
6
common tax adjustments may not qualify
In Reise v. Commissioner," the Tax Court continued to build
the
reasoning of Standing and Polk by allowing deficiency
on
interest on state income taxes as a business expense deduction in
calculating a taxpayer's net operating loss. In Reise, again, there
was no issue that the adjustments related to the taxpayers' underlying business3 In adopting the rulings of Standing and Polk, the
Tax Court found that its previous holding in Aaron v. Commission-

32. Id.
33. See Polk, 276 F.2d at 603 ("Under such facts, it is to be expected that a final
anaysis and examination of the return will result in a valuation considerably different

from that adopted by the taxpayer.").
34. Id. at 602.

35. Id. at 603.
36. For example, it would seem that the adjustments in Redlark (related to errors made
in converting revenue from an accrual to a cash basis) were theoretically "avoidable."
Such conversions are a rather common accounting practice, where errors should not really
be "expected." If the majority's reliance on Polk means that a certain level of taxpayer
negligence is acceptable, issues about what an acceptable level is will likely vary by
taxpayer and reviewing court. See infra notes 245-48 and accompanying text (discussing
Judge Halpern's view that the majority opinion does not provide a workable rule for

future cases).
37. 35 T.C. 571 (1961), affd, 299 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1962).
38. See 1d. at 578-580.
39. See id.at 572 (deliberating on the issue of whether income from the taxpayer's
hide and skins sales business should have been reported on an accrual rather than a cash

basis).
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er4° should be overturned.41 In Aaron, the Tax Court had held
that state income taxes were not deductible as a trade or business
expense for purposes of calculating net operating losses.42 The
provision at issue in Aaron and Reise stated that the deductibility
of nonbusiness expenses for net operating loss purposes was limited to the amount of a taxpayer's nonbusiness income,43 but no
such statutory limitation applied to deductions "attributable to" the
operation of a trade or business.' In defining "attributable to" as
used in that section, the Aaron court had held that "the connection
contemplated by the statute is a direct one rather than a remote
one.145 This meant that while taxes paid on real property used in
the business would be deductible, state income taxes incurred on
business profits would not.' In overturning Aaron, the court in
Reise noted that neither Standing nor Polk had referenced it.47 The
Reise court now believed that the latter decisions were "sound and
correct," and that the language and holding in Aaron should no
longer be regarded as a "proper and correct construction" of the
section at issue.'
The Tax Court has distinguished the holdings of Standing,
Polk, and Reise on at least one occasion, however. In Tanner v.
Commissioner,49 the Tax Court held that because of specific legislative history, state income taxes are not comparable to deficiency
interest and are consistently nondeductible for purposes of calculating adjusted gross income.5 ° In Tanner, the taxpayer had constructed arguments for the deductibility of state income taxes for
adjusted gross income purposes based on the holdings of both
Standing and Reise. The taxpayer argued that if expenses and interest relating to income tax deficiencies are deductible per Standing,

40. 22 T.C. 1370 (1954).
41. See Reise, 35 T.C. at 579.
42. See id. at 576.
43. See id. at 573 (citing § 122(d)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939). Current
I.R.C. § 172(d)(4) contains substantially the same provision: "In the case of a taxpayer
other than a corporation, the deductions allowable by this chapter which are not attributable to a taxpayer's trade or business shall be allowed only to the extent of the amount
of the gross income not derived from such trade or business." ILR.C. § 172(d)(4) (1994).
44. See Reise, 35 T.C. at 573.

45. Id. at 577 n.6.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

See id. at 578.
See id. at 579.
Id.
45 T.C. 145, 149-50 (1965), affd per curiam, 363 F.2d 36 (4th Cir. 1966).
See id. at 149-51.
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then "certainly a tax itself based on business income should be so
deductible."5 ' The Tax Court responded that, while the court in
Standing had found that neither the committee reports nor the
regulations specifically mentioned deficiency interest, the relevant
committee reports and regulations did specifically provide that state
income taxes, even though arising from business income, were
never to be deductible in computing gross income.52 The taxpayer
then argued that because state taxes were deductible for purposes
of calculating net operating losses per Reise, they should be so
deductible in calculating adjusted gross income.53 The Tax Court
responded again that although the argument was "not without logic," it must be rejected because "[t]he net operating loss provisions
and the provision with regard to the computation of adjusted gross
income are not interdependent." '4 Further, as in the argument
based on Standing, while committee reports and regulations concerning the deductibility of state income taxes for net operating
loss purposes were silent, those sources clearly denied the deduction for adjusted gross income purposes
Since these pre-1987 cases held that deficiency interest from a
trade or business conducted as a sole proprietorship was deductible,
at least in certain circumstances, it should logically follow that
interest incurred on adjustments related to a trade or business conducted via a flow-through entity should have been similarly held to
be deductible. However, in True v. United States,56 a case involving pre-1987 law that was affirmed by the Tenth Circuit, interest
on deficiencies arising from businesses conducted as partnerships
and S corporations was found not to be deductible as a trade or
business expense5 7 In arriving at a result that the court admitted
sounded "somewhat like a page from Alice in Wonderland," ' the
court held that if the interest payments were considered business
expenses, they would have to be taken at the partnership or S
corporation level and not by the individual taxpayer.59 However,

51. Id. at 149.
52. See id. at 150.
53. See id.
54. Tanner, 45 T.C. at 150.
55. See id.
56. 93-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCM) 1 50,461, 89,424 (D. Wyo. 1993), affd per curian
without published opinion, 35 F.3d 574 (10th Cir. 1994).
57. See id. at 89,427.
58. Id.
59. See id.
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since those entities are not obligated to pay tax, deficiency interest
could not be deducted at that level either.' The court therefore
concluded that deficiency interest payments related to adjustments
of partnership or S corporation income are "merely personal" and
"can not attain the character of a business expense."'"
B. Post-1986 Case Law: The Tax Court Avoids the Issue
While the general issue of the deductibility of deficiency interest has been presented to the Tax Court on a number of occasions
since the addition of I.R.C. § 163 in 1986, until Redlark, the facts
presented never compelled the court to directly address the validity
of the temporary regulation. For example, in Rose v. Commissioner62 the Tax Court expressly stated that it was neither ruling on
the validity of the regulation nor expressing an opinion with regard
to its invalidation in Miller I in denying the taxpayer's deduction
of deficiency interest.' In Rose, the taxpayers claimed only that
the deficiency interest constituted investment interest under I.R.C. §
163(h)(2)(B), attributable to a gain from a partnership in which the
taxpayer was a general partner." Citing Polk, the court noted that
the taxpayers had not shown that the tax deficiency was "a normal
or usual incident of the partnership's business."e In fact, since the
taxpayers had stipulated that the interest expense arose solely because of their "failure to timely pay taxes on their income," the
court found that "[t]heir decision to pay the income taxes after the
due date [was] inherently personal."
In James W. Tippin67 a taxpayer facing bankruptcy under
Chapter 11 made "adequate protection payments" to the IRS on his
delinquent taxes. The IRS applied some of the payments to interest, and the taxpayer subsequently attempted to claim a related

60. See id. The merit of this conclusion is beyond the scope of this Comment. But see
infra notes 258-65 and accompanying text (discussing briefly its importance in the context
of the Redlark decision).
61. True, 93-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ( 50,461, at 89,427.
62. 69 T.C.M. (CCH) I 50,484(M), 1914 (1995).
63. Id. at 1915 n.3. See also infra notes 73-81 and accompanying text (discussing
Miller 1).
64. See Rose, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 9 50,484(M), at 1915 n.2.
65. Id. at 1916.
66. Id.
67. 104 T.C. 518 (1995).
68. ld.at 521-22. "Adequate protection payments" are used in bankruptcy cases to preserve secured creditors' positions (e.g., additional or replacement liens on other property).
d at 522 n.3.
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deduction. 9 Even though the taxpayer was a lawyer operating as
a sole proprietor and the "adequate protection payments" made to
the IRS related to his law office receivables, the Tax Court held
that there was "no showing that the interest was an ordinary and
necessary expense of [the taxpayer's] law practice, or of any other
business carried on by [the taxpayer]."7' Thus, as in Rose, the
Court never had to reach the issue of, and specifically disclaimed
any opinion on, the validity of the temporary regulation.7'
In summary, while the Redlark majority was technically correct in holding that a consistent body of pre-1987 case law allowed
the deduction of deficiency interest, it can hardly be said that those
cases define an expansive rule. The threshold for satisfying the
general requirements of "ordinary and necessary" trade or business
expenses in pre-1987 cases, as well as the "properly allocable"
language of I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(A) in post-Tax Reform Act of 1986
cases, is high. It perhaps even "requires documentation that shows
how the position taken made good business or investment
sense." Cases brought both before and after the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 therefore suggest that the circumstances that give rise to a
review of the validity of the temporary regulation are narrow. On
the one hand, adjustments like those in Redlark, clearly directlyrelated and approaching the level of the "expected" or "unavoidable" adjustments described in Polk, will certainly trigger a court's
review of the validity of the regulation. On the other hand, a record virtually bereft of any support for a valid business nexus
certainly will not. The harder question, then, is when those cases
that fit somewhere in between will trigger such review.

69. See id. at 522-23.
70. Id. at 529. The court distinguished the taxpayers' situation from Polk, stating:
Unlike the taxpayer in Polk, here petitioner has not made a showing that the
1983 income tax deficiency on which he paid interest arose as a normal or
usual incident of his law practie ...
. Indeed, the record is completely silent
as to the source of income, or other circumstances, that gave rise to this income tax deficiency.
Id at 530. The court noted that the fact that the IRS obtained a secured interest in the
receivable of the law practice as collateral for the late taxes was not sufficient to support
a business nexus. Id. at 530 n.10.
71. See id. at 529 n.9.
72. William L. Raby, Deducting Interest on a Form 1040 Deficiency, 67 TAX NOTES
945, 946 (1995).
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C. Miller: Treatment of Pre-1987 Case Law
Miller P appears to be the first case in which a court directly attempted to resolve the conflict between the statute and the
temporary regulations. In brief, the Millers had formed a corporation to market grain grown on their family farm that had a fiscal
year ending several months prior to the Millers' calendar tax
year.7 During the spread between taxable years, the Millers treated any funds received from the corporation for sales of grain as
"loans" that were not recognized as personal income until the
following personal tax year.7 Not surprisingly, the IRS disregarded the loan arrangement and made corresponding adjustments to
the Millers' farm income for the years in question.76 The Millers
attempted to deduct the interest imposed on the resulting deficiencies77 Given the constraints discussed above (i.e., that the
taxpayer's position should make good business or investment
sense), these facts would not appear to require a court's direct
evaluation of the validity of the temporary regulations.
Nevertheless, the district court in Miller I initially held that
the temporary regulation was invalid to the extent it provided a per
se rule of nondeductibility.7 8 A taxpayer appeal backfired, however, when the Eighth Circuit upheld the regulation as a reasonable
interpretation of the statute. 9 The principal difference between the
holdings of the district and appellate courts in the Miller decisions
is essentially the same as the split between the majority and dissent
opinions in Redlark. As mentioned above," the district court in

73. 841 F. Supp. 305 (D.N.D. 1993).
74. See Miller 11, 95-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) [ 50,068 at 87,231. The court later
found that the corporation was essentially only a "trade name" or conduit and indistinguishable from the family farm itself. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 87,232.
78. See Miller I, 841 F. Supp. at 310 (holding as a matter of law that "the agency's
construction of the term 'personal interest' in IR.C. § 163(h)(2)(A), to include interest on
income tax deficiencies derived from business income, is overly broad. The IRS's implementing regulation is therefore invalid on this point."). The court eventually determined
that the "loans" were an "obviously improper income deferral scheme," and therefore the
interest on the underlying deficiency was not an ordinary and necessary business expense.
Miller 11, 95-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) '1 50,068 at 87,232.
79. See Miller 111,
65 F.3d at 691 ("Thus, contrary to the conclusion of the district
court, the provision in [Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-9T(b)(2)(i)(A)] that the interest paid on
underpayments of income taxes is per se nondeductible personal interest is valid.. .
80. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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Miller I interpreted legislative history as demonstrating that Congress did not intend to depart from the pre-1987 case law that
allowed the deduction of deficiency interest "to the extent that such
interest can
be characterized as an ordinary and necessary business
81
expense."
In Miller II the district court clarified that the holding in
Miller I, invalidating the temporary regulation, was merely a continuation or acknowledgment of the pre-1987 case law of Polk,
Standing, and Reise.' Citing Polk extensively, the Miller II court
then concluded that to meet the limited exception under I.R.C. §
163(h)(2)(A), the underlying tax deficiency "must be the result of
an error which is typical of, and reasonably anticipated in, the
commercial field in which the taxpayer engages." 3 Finding that
"no 'hard-headed' businessman.., would have been willing to
incur the income tax deficiencies and concomitant interest expenses" 84 that the Millers did, the district court granted the
government's motion for summary judgment.'
The Eighth Circuit was far more deferential to the regulatory
authority of the IRS and did not really address the import of the
pre-1987 cases. Instead, it relied solely on the construction of the
statutory language and regulations (as well as legislative history) in
finding that the regulation was a permissible construction of the
statute. 6 The court noted that even if it thought the taxpayer's
argument (that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was not intended to
alter the holdings of the pre-1987 case law) had "some logical
force," it would not have affected its decision." The majority in
Redlark noted that the Miller III decision was therefore "without
conclusion as to the pre-section 163(h) state of the law." 8

81. Miller 1, 841 F. Supp. at 310.
82. See Miller II, 95-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) '1 50,068 at 87,230.
83. Id. at 87,232.
84. See Miller II, 95-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
50,068 at 87,232.
85. See iL
86. See Miller III, 65 F.3d at 691 ("Because [Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1639T(b)(;)(i)(A)] is neither inconsistent with the language of the statute nor at odds with
the legislative history and directly tracks the statement of the staff committee in the General Explanation, we conclude the regulation represents a permissible construction of the
statute.").
87. Id. at 690.
88. Redlark, 106 T.C. at 38.
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D. Redlark: Treatment of Pre-1987 Case Law
The facts of Redlark meet all the criteria discussed above as
necessary to implicate the validity of the regulation-they clearly
fall within the I.R.C. §§ 162 and 62 "trade or business" relatedness
restrictions. In fact, in Redlark, the IRS had stipulated that a portion of the deficiencies assessed against the taxpayers, who conducted a valid unincorporated business, was directly attributable to
errors made in converting business revenue from an accrual basis
to a cash basis. 9 Nevertheless, Judge Tannenwald noted that the
issue of whether the interest qualified for deduction under I.R.C. §
162(a) (and "as a result" under the "properly allocable" language
of I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(A)-should the temporary regulation be found
invalid) was not resolved by the IRS' stipulation.' As discussed
above, the court began its analysis by reviewing the pre-1987 case
law to make what it considered to be an independent, ancillary
determination that the "properly allocable to a trade or business"
exception was satisfied.9'
The majority conceded that while "there is some confusion in
the reasoning of the decided cases," their "bottomline conclusions"
were clear, exceptions to the general rule of deductibility under
I.R.C. § 162 will only arise if there is explicit legislative direction
that such results were intended.' In dissent, Judge Halpern characterized this portion of the majority's analysis as resting on a
belief that the pre-1987 cases were "woven into the fabric of the
Code in such a way that only a specific act of Congress could
remove them."93 In a final example of the majority's deference to
pre-1987 case law, the court recognized its own prior holding in
Tanner in concluding that the statute was sufficiently ambiguous to
warrant a review of legislative history.94 Clearly, however, the
majority's ensuing analysis was colored by the backdrop of Standing, Polk, and Reise.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

See id at 32.
Id. at 34.
See supra notes 16-17, 20 and accompanying text.
Redlark 106 T.C. at 37.
Id. at 74 (Halpem, J.,dissenting).
See id. at 39.
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In contrast, the dissents of both Judges Ruwe and Halpern in
Redlark downplayed the significance of the pre-1987 case law. For
example, Judge Ruwe reasoned that the principal cause of the
outcomes observed in those cases relied on by the majority was a
lack of guidance as to the proper treatment of deficiency interest in
the relevant statute, regulations, or legislative history.95 By applying the reasoning of the court in Tanner, he found that the legislative history and temporary regulations from the Tax Reform Act of
1986 put deficiency interest on an even footing with state income
taxes, and therefore called into question the viability of the pre1987 cases cited by the majority.' Judge Ruwe's dissent also
cites True in support of his argument that invalidating the regulation results in "discrimination" between sole proprietorships versus
partnerships and S corporations.' It should be noted, however,
that the court's reasoning in True did not involve the "relatedness"
issue as formulated above, but rather an "entity" issue about
whether the interest was properly considered attributable to the
individual taxpayers' business or to the businesses of their partnerships and S corporations.98
Judge Halpem's dissent suggests that the majority's reliance
on the pre-1987 case law was misplaced because the cited cases
involved questions where "the distinction between business and
personal interest was otherwise unimportant." Further, he points

95. See iL at 59 (Ruwe, J., dissenting).
96. See id ("Like the situation presented to us in Tanner, both the legislative history
and contemporaneous regulations support a holding that the interest paid on petitioners'
late income tax payment constitutes nondeductible 'personal interest."). Of course, the
rules relating to state income taxes discussed in Tanner do not speak to the deductibility
of deficiency interest, and while prior case law did establish that state income taxes are
not deductible, it "len[ds] no particular support to the expansion of that rule"--in and of
itself. See Raby & Raby, supra note 8, at 574. Judge Ruwe's argument seems to be
rather that the Conference Committee Report and Blue Book relating to the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, as forms of guidance, were similar to those sources relied on in Tanner.
See infra notes 203-07 and accompanying text.
97. See Redlark, 106 T.C. at 60 (Ruwe, J., dissenting).
98. See True, 93-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ( 50,461, at 89,426-27 (focusing on the language of
I.R.C. § 62(a)(1) allowing trade or business deductions "attributable to a trade or business
carried on by the taxpayer"). The court downplayed the obvious inconsistency in tax treatment between, for example, sole proprietorships and partnerships, noting that "[a]Ithough
the Trues' choice of business entity may not have yielded the results they desire in this
instance, they must bear the consequences of those choices and may not disown the burdens associated with those choices." Id. See also infra notes 254-67 and accompanying
text (discussing the "discrimination" resulting from the invalidation of the regulation in
Redlark).
99. Redlark, 106 T.C. at 74 (Halpern, J., dissenting).
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out that the "properly allocable" language of I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(A)
is charged with the treatment of all interest expense and not just
deficiency interest."° Because he finds that the pre-1987 cases do
not present a "coherent scheme of interest allocation," he concludes
that "[ilt would be a very small tail wagging a very large dog if
we were to let those cases determine what is a proper method of
interest allocation for all classifications of indebtedness."' 01 He
notes that the majority's reliance on pre-1987 cases, while allowing
it to hold that deficiency interest will be deductible in some circumstances, does not result in the development of workable guidelines for allocating interest in future cases."°
E. IRS Arguments Regarding Pre-1987 Case Law
The IRS apparently did not propose any of the arguments
regarding the pre-1987 cases voiced by the dissenting judges in
Redlark. Instead, relying on the language quoted above from
Polk, 3 the IRS tried to argue that deficiency interest is not generally a deductible business expense so that any pre-1987 cases allowing a deduction were just "unfounded and wrong."'' "1 In response, the Redlark majority noted that while the Polk language
"narrows the types of situations where the ordinary and necessary
business expense requirement" can be satisfied, it did not support a
rule of per se nondeductibility. 5 As Judge Laro noted in his concurrence in Redlark- "The nuts and bolts of this case is that the
Commissioner continues to disagree with the pre-TRA (Tax Reform
Act of 1986) judicial view that an individual engaged in a trade or
business may deduct from gross income the amount of interest on
a Federal income tax liability that is attributable to his or her
business."'" Indeed, by choosing to argue that the pre-1987 cases
were decided incorrectly, rather than attempting to distinguish them
from the instant case based on the changes included in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (or any of the arguments suggested by the dissent),'" the IRS arguably made it easier to characterize the tem-

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
Polk.
106.
107.

See id.
Id.
See id. at 75.
See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
Redlark, W06 T.C. at 36.
Id. at 37. This seems obvious given that the taxpayer was allowed the deduction in
Id. at 57 (Laro, J.,concurring).
See supra notes 93-102 and accompanying text.
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porary regulation as an unwarranted attempt by the IRS to change
the result of the pre-1987 decisions. Further, the IRS' arguments
regarding pre-1987 case law were likely not strengthened by its
rather inconsistent position regarding this issue generally. For example, the IRS initially filed a nonacquiescence in response to
Standing, maintaining that neither deficiency interest nor legal and
accounting fees were deductible for purposes of determining adjusted gross income."°s However, the IRS filed an acquiescence to
Reise, allowing that deficiency interest is deductible for purposes of
determining net operating losses."°
F. Summary
In summary, it seems that neither the Redlark majority opinion
nor the dissenting opinions present completely satisfying characterizations of the viability of the pre-1987 case law as it applies to
the temporary regulation at issue here. For example, the majority's
10
treatment does not appear to recognize that the "sea change"'
that occurred with regard to the treatment of interest deductions by
individuals as a result of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 had any
effect on the viability of pre-1987 case law. However, the structure
of I.R.C. § 163(h), with its general prohibition and specifically
enumerated exceptions, does suggest a presumption against the
deductibility of interest generally for individuals. Such a presumption clearly did not exist in the pre-1987 world of Standing, Polk,
and Reise. Further, as discussed above, those cases allow the deduction of deficiency interest in only rather limited circumstances.
However, the Redlark dissenters' arguments regarding a more limited role for the related precedent are not entirely convincing either.
For example, while it is true that before the Tax Reform Act of
1986 there were perhaps fewer occasions for individuals to worry

108. See 1958-1 C.B. 7. The complete nonacquiescence was later withdrawn and an acquiescence regarding the classification of legal and accounting fees incurred in the process
of settling a federal income tax dispute was substituted. 1992-20 I.R.B. 4; 1993-1 I.R.B.
5.
109. See 1969-2 C.B. XXV (acquiescence in result only). The IRS also later filed an
acquiescence to Polk in this regard. Id. See also Rev. Rul. 70-40, 1970-1 C.B. 50 (holding that both state income taxes and deficiency interest on both state and federal income
taxes are "attributable to a taxpayer's trade or business" for net operating loss calculation

purposes).
110. Sheppard, supra note 8, at 641 ("In 1986, Congress repealed the deduction for personal interest except for residential mortgage interest . . . This was a sea change--and
not just for heavily indebted consumers-because it basically implies a presumption
against deduction of interest by individuals.").
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about the characterization of interest as business or nonbusiness
(because it was all generally deductible), such characterization was

still vitally important for a number of reasons, as represented by
the cases cited by the majority.'
Finally, it is interesting that one of the only points upon
which both the majority and dissenting opinions agreed was that
the court's previous holding in Tanner directed at least a further
review of legislative history."' The differing references to the Tanner decision illustrate that the pre-1987 case law is of course mere-

ly a part of the statutory interpretation."' As discussed below,
competing sources of guidance in a court's examination of the
validity of a tax regulation include the "plain language" or ambiguity of the provision itself, its contemporaneous and subsequent
legislative history, and the framework of any related regulations (as
well as existing judicial interpretations of the provision). Practically
then, the weight to be properly accorded any one particular source
of guidance is necessarily dependent on the court's view of the
relative strength of all the others. The following discussion examines the framework that the Redlark court used to integrate the
principles of the pre-1987 case law with other sources of guidance.

111. In Standing, for example, a timing issue was implicated because the taxpayers were
on a cash-basis for nonbusiness items and accrual basis for business items. See Standing
v. Comm'r, 259 F.2d 450, 452 (4th Cir. 1958). However, since the taxpayers in Standing
had previously elected to take the standard deduction, they likely did not get the benefit
of the full effect of the change to a below-the-line deduction. See id. This latter point
was also the concern in Tanner. See Tanner v. Comm'r, 45 T.C. 145, 146 (1965). Notably, Polk and Reise both involved net operating loss calculations. See supra notes 26-27,
37-38 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text (discussing the Redlark court's use
of Tanner); see infra notes 191-224 and accompanying text (discussing the Redlark court's
analysis of legislative history). However, the majority and dissent diverged concerning the
effect of legislative history on the validity of the regulation.
113. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text (discussing the Redlark majority's
reliance on pre-1987 case law to interpret the "properly allocable" phrase of I.R.C. §
163(h)(2)(A)). Such an ordering is perhaps warranted because it is predictive of the outcome. If a court, as did the majority in Redlark and the district court in Miller I, determines that existing case law is to be accorded deference, subsequent legislative and administrative changes will be held to a higher level of scrutiny. In contrast, those judges
who have given greater emphasis to the administrative power of the IRS or the literal
language of the statute seemed to reach the viability of the case law almost as an afterthought. See, e.g., Redlark, 106 T.C 74-75 (Halpern, J., dissenting).
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II. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY INTERPRETATION

The judicial interpretation of tax regulations is unique when
compared to other areas of administrative law because of the complexity of the underlying statutes, frequency with which they are
amended, and generally lengthy accompanying legislative history.4 While courts reviewing tax regulations usually begin with
an examination of the statutory text, they only rarely find the interpretive answer to be obvious at that point. 5 Redlark is a prime
example of this practice. Perhaps due to its specialization, the Tax
Court seems more inclined than other courts to delve into legislative history to determine the validity of a regulation." 6 As mentioned above, Redlark is noteworthy because the Tax Court judges,
who are supposed to be experts on tax law, could not agree about
so many different points of interpretation. Even when the court
appeared to agree on at least the theoretically appropriate standard
of review, the judges seemed to apply it differently in practice and
certainly disagreed about the result of the standard's application to
the regulation at issue.
A. Standard of Review
At the outset it should be noted that temporary regulations,
such as those involved here, are accorded the same weight as final
regulations." 7 However, so-called interpretive regulations are accorded less weight, at least in theory, than legislative regulations."' In practice, this distinction may be very minor." 9 Only
legislative regulations have the legal effect of statutes in changing
existing law; the purpose of interpretive regulations is generally
considered to be to clarify existing law. 2 Interpretive and legislative tax regulations are usually distinguished by the source of an-

114. See Ellen P. Aprill, Muffled Chevron: Judicial Review of Tax Regulations, 3 FLA.
TAX REv. 51, 53 (1996).

115. See id. at 54.
116. See id. (noting that "[t]he more specialized the court, the more detailed and
lengthy is the examination").
117. See Peterson Marital Trust, 102 T.C. 790, 797 (1994).
118. See infra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
119. See Aprill, supra note 114, at 60 ("Mhe distinction between legislative and interpretive regulations is often blurred in practice, and the supposedly diverse standards of
judicial review tend to converge and even to coalesce.") (quoting Boris I. Bittker & Lawrence Lokken, FEDERAL TAX'N OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFS, 9 110.4.2 at 110-30
(1981)). See also Lawrence C. Zelenak, Should Courts Require the Internal Revenue Service to be Consistent? 40 N.Y.U. TAX L. REV. 411, 427 n.100 (1985)).
120. See Aprill, supra note 114, at 55-56.
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thority under which the regulation was promulgated: regulations
promulgated under the authority of I.R.C. § 7805(a) are considered
interpretive, while regulations promulgated under the authority of a
specific code section are considered legislative.' Most tax regulations, including the temporary regulation at issue in Redlark, are
considered interpretive by the Treasury and the IRS.'
As noted above, interpretive regulations are in theory owed
less deference than legislative regulations."as In practice, however,
interpretive tax regulations are accorded significant deference."4
For example, the traditional standard for the review of interpretive
tax regulations, as stated in National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v.
United States," presumes deference; it holds that interpretive regulations should be upheld as long as they implement a congressional mandate in some reasonable manner."te Further, "[t]he choice
among reasonable interpretations is for the Commissioner, not the
courts."'" The National Muffler standard of reasonableness is determined via a review of whether the regulation "harmonizes" with
the plain language, origins, and purpose of the statute." Relevant
factors in determining reasonableness under the National Muffler
standard include: "the length of time the regulation has been in
effect, the reliance placed on it, the consistency of the
Commissioner's interpretation, and the degree of scrutiny Congress
had devoted to the regulation during subsequent re-enactments of
the statute."' 29 As could be expected, "the various factors used to
test ... deference permit courts considerable leeway". 3 ' Thus, in
practice National Muffler has been somewhat unevenly applied.''

121. See id.at 56-57.
122. See id.at 57.
123. See Redlark, 106 T.C. at 38 (citing United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S.
16, 24-25 (1982)).
124. See Aprill, supra note 114, at 59 (noting that "in tax, deference to the administrative agency rather than independent judicial judgment has been the default rule").
125. 440 U.S. 472, 476 (1979) (reviewing the validity of regulations that defined the
term "business league" for purposes of I.R.C. § 501(c)(6)).
126. See Aprill, supra note 114, at 58.
127. National Muffler Dealers, 440 U.S. at 488.
128. See id. at 477.
129. Id.
130. Aprill, supra note 114, at 61.
131. Id.
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The traditional National Muffler standard has apparently been
largely replaced by the standard later developed in Chevron U.SA.
Inc. v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.' Under Chevron,
the court is to "use 'traditional tools of statutory construction,'
particularly legislative history, to determine congressional intent at
step one and defer to an interpretation of the agency defended on
any basis at step two."'3 Some courts (including the Supreme
Court and the Tax Court) have recently reformulated the Chevron
standard to reflect a textualist viewpoint. 4 Applied by those favoring a "plain meaning" philosophy, the first step of Chevron, as
reformulated, looks only to the statutory text.'35 The second step
defers to any reasonable interpretation of the agency, including
those unrelated to legislative history. 6
While the Tax Court has theoretically adopted Chevron in
reviewing regulations, in practice, the Tax Court's application of
the Chevron standard basically reiterates the principles of National
Muffler. As Judge Tannenwald has noted:
we are inclined to the view that the impact of the traditional, i.e., National Muffler standard, has not been changed by
Chevron, but has merely been restated in a practical twopart test with possibly subtle distinctions as to the role of
legislative history and the degree of deference to be accorded to a regulation. 7
As applied by the Tax Court, if an inquiry into whether Congress
has directly addressed the precise question at issue results in a
"yes," then "that is the end of the matter."'3 If, however,

132. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The Tax Court in Redlark references Chevron via
NationsBank v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 810, 813-14 (1995). See
Redlark, 106 T.C. at 66.
133. Aprill, supra note 114 at 63-64 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9).
134. See generally id. at 64-67 (noting that Justice Scalia has been largely responsible
for the "textualist revolution" that produced the change in the Court's formulation of the

Chevron doctrine). In a textualist twist to the application of the Chevron standard, the
concurring opinions in Redlark of Judges Swift and Laro found that the statute was not
ambiguous and held therefore that the inquiry should begin and end with the statutory

text only. See Redlark, 106 T.C. at 48 (Swift, J., concurring); id. at 54-55 (Laro, J., concurring) (although Judge Laro does go on to review the legislative history).
135. See Aprill, supra note 114, at 66.
136. See id.

137. Central Pa. Sav. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 104 T.C. 384, 392 (1995).
138. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
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the court determines Congress has not directly addressed
the precise question at issue, the court does not simply
impose its own construction on the statute.....
Rather, if
the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the stat139
ute.
While Tax Court opinions do not generally presume that the meaning of the statute is plain, in practice, legislative history is generally only considered in step two (to judge whether the IRS' position
is reasonable.)"4 As the majority noted in Redlark, if the regulation "fills a gap or defines a term in a way that is reasonable in
light of the legislature's revealed design," in 1step
two, the court
41
will accord the regulation "controlling weight."'
The majority in Redlark appears to have applied a less deferential version of the Chevron standard-in fact it more closely resembles National Muffler. Judge Tannenwald began his statutory interpretation with the language of I.R.C. § 163(h) itself.42 Even
though he found the language otherwise unambiguous (because of
the doctrine developed in pre-1987 case law), as noted above, 43
he relied on Tanner for the proposition that in a "comparable situation" the court found sufficient ambiguity to review legislative
history.' 44 If the majority had not deferred to its previous holding
in Tanner in this way, it would not have gone on to its "step two"
examination of the regulatory framework and legislative history. 45
Judge Halpern's dissent in Redlark also relied upon
NationsBank v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co.1" for the appropriate standard of review. He said the court must address two questions: (1) whether I.R.C. § 163(h) is "silent or ambiguous" with
regard to either (a) the standard for determining "properly alloca-

139. Id (footnotes omitted).
140. See Aprill, supra note 114, at 67.
141. Redlark, 106 T.C. at 39 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.)
142. See id. See also infra notes 155-160 and accompanying text.
143. See id.
144. Id.
145. See infra notes 191-92 and accompanying text (discussing how the Redlark majority would have found that standing alone I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(A), without regard to legislative history, would have been insufficient to support the regulation).
146. 115 S. Ct. 810, 813-14 (1995) (relying mainly on Chevron to describe the appropriate standard of review).
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ble" interest, or (b) the "specific issue at hand" (which he phrased
as "whether interest paid with respect to an individual's Federal
income tax liability is deductible"); and (2) whether the temporary
regulation is a "permissible interpretation" of the statute "in that it
'fills a gap or defines a term in a way that is reasonable in light
of the legislature's revealed design."' 47 Because he found the
statutory language ambiguous and the "tracing" methodology contained within the regulations a permissible interpretation, Judge
Halpem found the Chevron/NationsBank tests satisfied and the
regulation valid." s
While not all appellate courts have adopted the Chevron standard in reviewing interpretive tax regulations, the Eighth Circuit
apparently has. In Miller IIl, the Eighth Circuit mentioned both
Chevron and National Muffler before launching into a rather
lengthy review of the legislative history of I.R.C. § 163(h). The
court framed its role by reference to practically all of the language
from Chevron promoting deference to the agency's regulation. 49
After finding the statute itself ambiguous, it followed Chevron's
guidance in determining that because the regulation was neither
inconsistent with the language of the statute nor at odds with the
legislative history, it was a permissible construction. 5 '
At least in theory, the Ninth Circuit does not consider the
Chevron standard applicable to interpretive tax regulations.'
It
has continued to apply the principles of National Muffler in a twostep process: (1) examining the statutory language to determine
whether the regulation is in reasonable harmony with it, then (2)
using legislative history to review origin and purpose to determine
whether the regulation is a reasonable interpretation.'
Theoretically, differences in the outcome of Redlark on appeal could result
from the application of the two standards (Ninth Circuit vs. Tax
Court), although it is unclear how different in practice the two will
be. However, because National Muffler-type methods are generally
considered even less deferential than Chevron-type methods, the
apparent consensus among commentators that the Ninth Circuit will

147. Redlark, 106 T.C. at 66 (citing Nationsbank, 115 S. CL at 813-14).
148. See id.
149. See Miller III, 65 F.3d at 689-90.
150. See id. at 691.
151. See Aprill, supra note 114, at 74. Indeed, the regulation at issue in Chevron was
legislative, not interpretive. Id. at 62-63.
152. See id. at 70, 74 (citing Pacific First Fed. Sav. Bank v. Comm'r, 962 F.2d 800
(9th Cir. 1992)).
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uphold the Tax Court's invalidation of the regulation in Redlark
seems well-founded."'
B. Statutory Language
A judge's conclusion about the ambiguity or clarity of the
statutory language of I.R.C. § 163(h), like the deference accorded
to existing judicial interpretation, is predictive of whether he will
find the temporary regulation valid. This is largely because under
the standards above, legislative history will be considered as a
possibly redeeming factor in saving a regulation only if the statute
is deemed ambiguous. 4
As is the practice in most tax cases, the majority in Redlark
begins the interpretive section of its analysis with the statutory
language of I.R.C. § 163. The majority identifies the key phrase of
I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(A) as "interest paid or accrued on indebtedness
properly allocable to a trade or business."' 55 Without using the
term "unambiguous," the majority notes that, without more, that
language would allow the taxpayer to prevail. 56 This conclusion
is based on the pre-1987 cases that found deficiency interest of the
type involved in Redlark to be an ordinary and necessary business
expense.5 7 Of course, the majority's recognition of existing case
law in its determination of whether the statute is ambiguous makes
sense if it is accepted that "Congress does not legislate in a vacuum.' 58 The "properly allocable" language of I.R.C. § 163 may
then be easily cast as an unambiguous recognition of the principles
of Standing, Polk, and Reise line of cases.' 59 However, in a reference to Tanner, the majority then consistently deferred to its own
precedent, noting that "in a comparable situation dealing with the
deduction of State income taxes in computing adjusted gross income, we found sufficient ambiguity to cause us to look at the
legislative history and approve a regulation denying such a deduction " '
The concurring opinions relied even more heavily on "plain
language" analysis in concluding that the statutes were unambigu-

153. See id. at 77. See also supra note 8 (discussing commentators' views on the likelihood of the Ninth Circuit upholding Redlark).
154. See Lipton, supra note 10, at 222.
155. Redlark, 106 T.C. at 39.
156. See d.
157. See id. See also supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
158. Lipton, supra note 10, at 222.
159. See id.at 221.
160. Redlark, 106 T.C. at 39.
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ous. For example, Judge Swift found that regardless of the pre1987 case law the "statute speaks for itself."'' He determined
that "if there is no question about what an item of interest expense
relates to, and is allocable to, then the statute is clear and, if the
expense relates to the taxpayers' business, the statute allows the
deduction."'62 Judge Laro also noted that the "statute speaks for
itself," and that "legislative history should be sought to embellish
the text only when the meaning of the words therein is 'inescapably ambiguous."" 63 He concluded that the text was clear such
that "the beginning and end of our inquiry should be the statutory
text, and we should apply the plain and common meaning of the
statute.""' Even so, Judge Laro noted that a "plain reading" of a
statute may be altered by "clear legislative intent that is contrary to
the text."'" He therefore proceeded to consider whether there was
any "clear and unequivocal legislative intent" to support the
regulation's contrary position to the text.'6
At the other end of the spectrum, one commentator has described the dissents in Redlark as statutory analyses "in search of
an ambiguity."'67 The dissenting opinion authored by Judge Ruwe
specifically adopted the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit in Miller
III on this point."es Citing Chevron, the Eighth Circuit held in
Miller III that because Congress did not specifically define the
business interest exception within the statute, there was an implicit
legislative delegation of authority to the Commissioner to clarify
whether deficiency interest is "properly allocable" to a trade or
business. 69 Similarly, Judge Halpem's dissent found the statute's
161. It. at 48 (Swift, J.,concurring).
162. Il (holding that because the regulation provided that interest expense is not deductible, regardless of whether there is a question about what the interest related to, it
constitutes an "erroneous attempt to redefine the substantive provision" of the statute).
163. Id. at 54-55 (Laro, J., concurring) (quoting Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70,

76 n.3 (1984)).
164. Id. at 55 (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), and citing United States v.
Am. Trucking Assoc., 310 U.S. 534, 543-544 (1940)).
165. Redlark, 106 T.C. at 56.
166. Id.
167. Lipton, supra note 10, at 222. Lipton notes that the problem with the dissenting
judges' and Miller III courts' reasoning is that they assume that the statute is unclear, or
in other words, that Congress does legislate in a vacuum. See id.
168. See Redlark, 106 T.C. at 58 (Ruwe, J., dissenting) ("I disagree with the majority
for reasons already well stated by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Miller

v. United States.").
169. See Miller II, 65 F.3d at 690 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844) ("[I.R.C. §
163(h)(2)(A)], however, does not define what constitutes business interest. Therefore, there
is an implicit legislative delegation of authority to the Commissioner to clarify whether
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exception for business interest ambiguous because Congress did not
indicate a method of allocation or specify a result for the "specific
issue at hand"--whether deficiency interest was deductible.170
In summary, the Redlark decision contains three answers to the
pivotal threshold question of whether the statutory language is
ambiguous: (1) the majority's holding that it is not when considered in the context of pre-1987 case law; (2) the concurring
opinions' conclusions that it is not-standing on its own; and (3)
the dissenting opinions' determinations that it is.
C. Regulatory Framework
Against this backdrop it is not surprising that the three came to
different conclusions about the propriety of the regulatory framework relating to the deductibility of interest on tax deficiencies.
Judge Tannenwald noted that even though both the IRS and taxpayers failed to directly address Temporary Treasury Regulation §
1.163-8T, because § 1.163-9T, the section at issue, specifically
referenced that regulation, he would "deal first" with it."' Temporary Treasury Regulation § 1.163-8T gives meaning to the
statute's "properly allocable" language by providing an allocation
method based on the underlying expenditure, or use of debt proceeds. 2 The majority noted that, because it could be argued that
"the proceeds of an individual's income tax indebtedness cannot be
considered as expended in a trade or business," Temporary Trea-

income tax deficiency interest is 'properly allocable to a trade or business.").
170. Redlark, 106 T.C. at 67 (Halpem, J., dissenting) ('The term 'properly allocable' is
ambiguous, because Congress has not indicated the method by which, or the assumptions
under which, taxpayers, the Service, and the courts are to decide whether a particular
indebtedness is 'properly allocable' to a trade or business. Clearly, there is more than one
way to allocate interest. ... More importantly, the statute is silent with respect to the
specific issue at hand-whether interest with respect to an individual's Federal income tax
liability is deductible.').
171. Id at 40. See supra note 3 (quoting Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-9T(b)(2)(i)(A)
(1987) which references § 1.163-8T as it relates to underpayments of individual taxes and
indebtedness used to pay such taxes).
172. See Redlark 106 T.C. at 40 (citing Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-8T(c)(1) which provides: "Debt is allocated to expenditures in accordance with the use of the debt proceeds . . . debt proceeds and related interest expense are allocated solely by reference to
the use of such proceeds. . . .'). See generally § 1.163-ST(a)(1) (providing that "[t]his
section prescribes rules for allocating interest expense for purposes of applying sections
469 (the 'passive loss limitation') and 163(d) and (h) (the 'non-business interest
limitations')"); § 1.163-ST(a)(3) ("In general, interest expense on a debt is allocated in the
same manner as the debt to which such interest expense relates is allocated . . . [and]
[d]ebt is allocated by tracing disbursements of the debt proceeds to specific expenditures").
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sury Regulation § 1.163-9T(b)(2)(i)(A), providing that such interest
is always personal, could be considered just a specific example of
the expenditure method of allocation of § 1.163-8T."r However,
perhaps in reference to the NationsBank "specific issue at hand"
language, 74 the majority went on to question whether the IRS
exceeded its authority by applying the expenditure method specifically to deny all deductions of deficiency interest." The IRS had
argued that, under an application of the expenditure method, individual taxpayers' payments of deficiency interest could never be
considered trade or business expenses because individual income
taxes (which it ostensibly considered the underlying "debt" or
"expenditure") are always to be considered personal or "consumption expenditures."'7 6 The majority found this result unreasonable
however, holding:
Whatever the merits of such method of allocation may be
in other contexts, we do not think that the Secretary of the
Treasury should be entitled to use the authority conferred
by section 7805(a) to construct a formula which excludes
an entire category of interest expense in disregard of a
business connection such as exists herein."
Further, the majority was unconvinced by the IRS' conclusion that
§ 1.163-8T requires that an "income tax deficiency is ipso facto a
consumption expenditure."' 78 The majority cited Temporary Treasury Regulation § 1.163-8T(c)(3)(ii) (regarding the allocation method applicable to debt assumptions not involving cash disbursements) for the proposition that it is permissible to "analyze the
elements of the income tax indebtedness to determine whether its
'
imputed expenditure is properly allocable to business activity."'

173. See id. And, in fact, this is essentially the IRS' argument. See infra notes 178-80
and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
175. See Redlark, 106 T.C. at 40 ("The question to be resolved is whether section
7805(a) provides a sufficient basis to justify the application of the expenditure method of
allocation set forth in section 1.163-8T(c) . .. to the factual situation involved herein").
176. See Lipton, supra note 10, at 220.
177. Redlark, 106 T.C. at 40.
178. Id. at 41-42.
179. Id. at 42. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-8T(c)(3)(ii) ("If a taxpayer incurs or as-

sumes a debt in consideration for the sale or use of property, for services, or for any
other purpose, . . .and no debt proceeds are distributed to the taxpayer, the debt is treated for purposes of this section as if the taxpayer used an amount of the debt proceeds
equal to the balance of the debt outstanding at such time to make an expenditure for

such property, services, or other purpose").
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In fact, the majority notes that such an analysis "would be consistent with the overall legislative purpose in enacting section 163(h),
namely to end the deduction for interest incurred to fund consumption expenditures."'8 The majority therefore considered Temporary Treasury Regulation § 1.163-9T "sufficiently elliptical" to
allow its validity to be "independently determined" without further
reference to § 1.163-8T.'
Judge Swift's concurring opinion also followed the logic noted
in the majority opinion that Temporary Treasury Regulation §
1.163-8T does not necessarily dictate that deficiency interest could
not be allocated to a trade or business. In fact, he took this reasoning one step further. He found that Temporary Treasury Regulation
§ 1.163-8T(c)(3)(ii) not only provided an alternative rationale for
allowing an allocation based on the underlying components of the
tax, but compelled that result because the "underlying activity in
question" that gave rise "to the tax deficiency and to the
Government's extension of credit to petitioners" clearly related to
the taxpayers' business.' In a footnote, Judge Laro also noted
that "but for" Temporary Treasury Regulation § 1.1639T(b)(2)(i)(A), "there should be no dispute" that deficiency interest
is properly deductible, because under § 1.163-8T the interest is
connected to taxes paid on business income."
If the twin goals of administrative efficiency and consistency
are held to be most important, the analysis of the relevant regulatory framework in Judge Halpern's dissent provides a compelling
argument for accepting the validity of the regulation. His argument
regarding the regulatory framework itself is based on four principal
findings: (1) that the statutory term "properly allocable" is ambiguous; (2) that the "tracing method" of Temporary Treasury Regulation § 1.163-8T is a valid interpretation of the term "properly
allocable" generally; (3) that "a reasonable case can be made for
the proposition that all deficiency interest is personal;" and (4) that
§ 1.163-9T(b)(2)(i)(A) is "nothing more than a fact-specific appli-

180. Redlark, 106 T.C. at 42 (referring generally to the "sea change" dictated by the
Tax Reform Act of 1986).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 49 (Swift, J., concurring) (holding that the related deficiency interest was
properly allocable to the business under the regulation and therefore deductible under the

statute).
183. 1 at 55 n.6 (Laro, ., concurring) (citing Fort Howard Corp. and Subs. v.
Conmr'r, 103 T.C. 345, 352 (1994) ("[A]n expense is incurred 'in connection with' the

conduct of a trade or business if it is associated with or logically related.").
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cation" of § 1.163-8T.' The touchstone of Judge Halpern's analysis, which mirrors the IRS' argument in this regard, is that "money expended for Federal income taxes constitutes a consumption
expenditure, and not a cost of earning income. '""s If that is the
case, under the tracing method, deficiency interest (or interest on
any borrowing to pay taxes) is personal interest, regardless of the
reason the deficiency arose. As Judge Halpem notes, while this
'
approach is "wooden," it is nonetheless "unambiguous. ' Is
In summary, the Tax Court in Redlark again split along three
lines. The majority considered the regulatory framework surrounding the section at issue sufficient to rebut the presumption that the
expenditure allocation method must stop at the level of the tax
itself and not "look through" to its underlying components." The
concurrences considered such evidence as indicative that a "look
through" method was indeed the mandated result.' Finally, the
dissenting judges found that the expenditure allocation method of
the regulations was a permissible means of implementing the presumption that all amounts expended for individual income tax
represent nondeductible consumption expenditures.8 9
D. Contemporaneous Legislative History
As discussed above, the Tax Court generally uses legislative
history only in the second step of the Chevron methodology. It is
important to note, however, that the majority in Redlark prefaced
its discussion of the available "contemporaneous"'" legislative
history by stating that it would have found the provisions of I.R.C.
§ 163(h)(2)(A), standing alone, insufficient to support the regulation. " ' It was with this attitude that the majority began to evalu-

184.
185.
come
186.
187.

Redlark, 106 T.C. at 71 (Halpern, J., dissenting).
Id. Part of his support for this conclusion is that Congress has deemed Federal intaxes nondeductible, which he also finds reasonable. See id at 71-72.
Id. at 72.
See id. at 39 (majority opinion).

188. See id. at 48 (Swift, J., concurring).
189. See Redlark, 106 T.C. at 58-59 (Ruwe, L, dissenting).
190. The term "contemporaneous" is used rather loosely to distinguish the two sources
discussed here from clearly subsequent legislative actions discussed later because one of

the sources considered as "contemporaneous," the General Explanation of the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, was actually released one year after the statute's enactment. See, e.g., infra
note 216 and accompanying text.
191. See Redlark, 106 T.C. at 43. The majority supported this conclusion by noting that
the court has "consistently been reluctant to conclude that Congress overruled existing
case law when the statutory language does not compel such a conclusion and Congress
has not otherwise expressly indicated that such a result should ensue." Id. (citing Santa
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ate the import of the two relevant sources of contemporaneous
legislative history: the Conference Committee Report'" and the
General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986."93 As perhaps could be expected at this point, the Redlark court as a whole
did not agree on whether language in the Conference Committee
Report was ambiguous, or what weight should be accorded the
General Explanation.
1. Conference Committee Report

Standing in direct contradiction to the general belief that extensive legislative history accompanies tax rules,'94 the Conference
Committee Report is the only legislative history of section 163(h)
that directly addresses the issue. 95 Even so, that reference is
spare. After restating some of the statutory language,"9 the report
adds only one cryptic sentence: "Personal interest also generally
includes interest on tax deficiencies."'" Much of the debate about
the significance of this small piece of legislative history begins
with a single word in this sentence, "generally."

At first blush, most would agree that the word "generally" as
used above was probably intended to mean that there will be some
instances when deficiency interest is not to be considered personal
interest. The IRS has argued that "generally" was intended to reflect an exception for the deductibility of interest on past-due business taxes, like sales and excise taxes, which is specifically provided for in the regulations.'98 Therefore, at least in the context of

Anita Consol., Inc. v. Comm'r, 50 T.C. 536, 560 n.13 (1968)).
192. See H. R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. 11, at 154 (1986), reprinted in 1986-3 C.B. 154 [hereinafter Conference Committee Report].
193. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 100TH CONG., 1ST SEss., GENERAL ExPANATION OF Tim TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 (Comm. Print 1987) [hereinafter Blue Book].
194. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
195. See Redlark, 106 T.C. at 42.
196. Including, as the majority noted, the statement that "[plersonal interest is any interest, other than interest incurred or continued in connection with the conduct of a trade or
business ...
investment interest, or interest taken into account in computing the
taxpayer's income or loss from passive activities for the year." Id.(citing the Conference
Committee Report, supra note 192 at 154).
197. Conference Committee Report, supra note 192 at 154.
198. See Redlark, 106 T.C. at 44. The regulations specifically exclude interest due on
such taxes from the definition of personal interest. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1639T(b)(2)(iii)(A) (1987). Also, the Eighth Circuit must have found this argument persuasive.
In Miller III the court repeated the sentence from the Conference Committee Report without analyzing it. See Miller III, 65 F.3d at 687. Nevertheless, the court characterized it as
being supportive of the regulation's reasonableness. Id. See also Dan L. Mendelson and
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an individual's ability to deduct interest on federal income tax deficiencies, the meaning of the term "generally" is further dependent
on the meaning of the term "deficiencies."
The majority in Redlark noted that the word "deficiencies" has
"a long-established and well-known meaning" and should be considered a "term of art. ' The majority also noted that it should
be assumed that the conference committee used the word in this
well-established sense-to mean income, estate, and gift taxes
only. Given that, the majority holds that it is merely "logical"
to conclude that what is excluded by the term "generally" is interest that constitutes an ordinary and necessary business expense.
The majority finds its explanation far less strained than that of the
IRS (and Eighth Circuit), which requires that "generally" be read
as "always" and that the interpretation of the word "deficiencies"
be expanded "beyond its accepted meaning."
In his dissent, however, Judge Ruwe concluded that the term
"generally" modifies "tax deficiencies" and not "income tax deficiencies". °3 Thus, in Judge Ruwe's judgment, it was likely added
in recognition of the fact that Congress had specifically excluded
some interest on certain estate taxes from the definition of personal
interest.' He therefore held that the use of "generally" "was
both technically correct and consistent with the regulation's holding
that all interest on individual income tax deficiencies is personal
interest."' He went on to note that this context further suggests
that the allowance of a deduction was intended as a rare exception
to the norm.' It should not, therefore, "include the very common situation where an 'income tax deficiency' is based on adjustments to items reported on an individual's Schedule C." Final-

Carol Conjura, CA-8 Finds Blue Book "Highly Indicative" of Congress' Intent to Deny
Deduction for Interest on Taxes, 83 J. TAX'N 353, 353-54 (1995) (addressing the word

"general" in relation to exceptions for sales and excise taxes).
199. Redlark, 106 T.C. at 44.
200. See id.
201. See id. at 45.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 58-59 (Ruwe, J., dissenting).
204. Redlark 106 T.C. at 58-59 (referring to LR.C. § 163(h)(2)(E), which holds that
"interest on estate taxes imposed by section 2001 is, in certain circumstances, not personal

interest!).

205. Id. at 59 (emphasis added).
206. See id.
207. Id. At least one commentator agrees with Judge Ruwe's interpretation of the sentence. See Sheppard, supra note 8, at 642 ("Throwing common sense to the wind, the
majority read the word 'generally' . . . to mean that interest on income tax deficiencies is
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ly, Judge Halpem, in his dissent, came up with yet another way
that deficiency interest paid by an individual could have been the
exception intended by the use of the term "generally" (i.e., would
not be considered "personal interest" yet would not be in conflict
with the regulations).' In addition to his conclusion that the
Conference Committee Report does not exclusively support the
majority's interpretation of the statute, he also notes that the "aspect of the report relied on by the majority is ambiguous and
should be given little weight in determining what deficiency interest is personal interest." He concludes that the ambiguity of the
report only supports the conclusion that the regulation at issue here
is valid because the statute itself is ambiguous.2 1°
In summary, Judge Halpern appears to have the best of this
argument. After all, there is no better index of ambiguity than the
fact that the Tax Court itself cannot agree about the statement's
meaning. Further, while perhaps in other contexts a one-line statement should have more stature, it would be a slender thread on
which to hang a per se rule of nondeductibility. Finally, it is interesting that none of the opinions emphasized the sea-change aspect
of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 in the context of measuring the
import of the "generally" phrase included therein.2 '

not always nondeductible. How's that again? Judge Ruwe was astounded by this sophist-

ry.,).
208. See Redlark, 106 T.C. at 73 (referencing Haden Co. v. Comm'r, 165 F.2d 588,
591 (5th Cir. 1948), which concerned interest paid on an income tax deficiency attributable to the transfer of assets).
209. Id. at 74.
210. See id
211. In examining the import of Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-8T, the majority opinion
referenced the "overall legislative purpose" of the enactment of I.R.C. § 163(h) as being
to "end the deduction for interest incurred to fund consumption expenditures," but did not
similarly measure the import of "generally" from this portion of the Conference Committee Report. See supra note 180 and accompanying text. The Conference Committee Report
appears to be more supportive of Judge Halpern's conclusion that the "generally" phrase
should be given little weight than of the majority's conclusion that a "look through"

interpretation of the expenditure method within the temporary regulations better accords
with legislative intent. See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
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2. General Explanation of the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 ("Blue Book")
No such ambiguity was present regarding the following statement from the Blue Book accompanying the Tax Reform Act of
1986:
Personal interest also includes interest on underpayment of
individual Federal, State or local income taxes notwithstanding that all or a portion of the income may have
arisen in a trade or busiriess, because such taxes are not
considered derived from the conduct of a trade or business.2t 2
In a footnote at this point, the Blue Book went on to add:
Personal interest does not include interest on taxes, other
than income taxes, that are incurred in connection with a
trade or business. (For the rule that taxes on net income
are not attributable to a trade or business, see Treas. Reg.
Sec. 1.62-1(d), relating to nondeductibility of State income
taxes incomputing adjusted gross income.)"'
While the Blue Book gives support to the IRS' position, the
IRS could not "salvage" it in Redlark. The majority held that the
Blue Book:
[Is] not part of the legislative history although it is entitled
to respect .... Where there is no corroboration in the
actual legislative history, we shall not hesitate to disregard
the General Explanation as far as congressional intent is
concerned.... Given the clear thrust of the conference
committee report, the General Explanation is without foundation and must fall by the wayside. To conclude otherwise
would elevate it to a status and accord it a deference to
which it is simply not entitled 14

212. Redlark, 106 T.C. at 43 (quoting the Blue Book, at 266).
213. Id (quoting the Blue Book at 266 n.60). Of course, as discussed above, the rules
relating to state income taxes do not address deficiency interest generally. While prior
case law did establish that state income taxes are clearly nondeductible, it "lent no particular support to the expansion of that rule through the type of reasoning by analogy reflected in either the Blue Book or the . . . temporary regulation derived from it." Raby
& Raby, supra note 8, at 574.
214. Redlark, 106 T.C. at 45-46 (footnotes and citations omitted).
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The majority specifically mentioned the statement of one commentator that "[tihe Blue Book is on especially weak ground when it
adopts anti-taxpayer positions not taken in the committee reports." 5 In a footnote, the majority went on to point out that
while the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was itself the product of the
99th Congress, the Blue Book was published during the 100th
Congress, and was therefore not even "entitled to the respect it
might otherwise be accorded if it had been prepared for the Congress which enacted see. 163(h).""2 6
In his concurrence, Judge Laro also noted that the Blue Book,
while entitled to respect, is not legislative history and was not
approved by the Congress before its release.217 Judge Laro added
that "we should not be bound by statements in the 1986 Bluebook
that are unsupported by and contrary to section 163 and its legislative history." ' He described the purpose of the Blue Book as:
[Providing] in one volume, a compilation of the legislative
history or a piece of tax legislation. While the document is
most helpful as a handy reference volume it also gives
some guidance. Where the Blue Book's explanation differs
from that in a conference report it may serve to alert the
reader that a technical correction is needed to reconcile
the views.219
While neither of the dissents addressed the weight to be accorded the Blue Book, the IRS and the Eighth Circuit in Miller III
(although it cited many of the same cases as the majority in
Redlark) came to a contrary conclusion regarding its importance.
While the IRS conceded that the Blue Book was "not controlling
authority on legislative intent because it was prepared by committee staff after the enactment of the statute," the IRS argued that it
is "nevertheless . . . 'a valuable aid to understanding the statute,'
and is 'entitled to great respect."'" The IRS went on to argue

215. Lipton, supra note 10, at 221 (quoting Livingston, What's Blue and White and Not
Quite as Good as a Committee Report: General Explanations and the Role of "Subsequent" Tax Legislative History, 11 AMR. J. TAX POL'Y 91 (1994)).
216. Redlark, 106 T.C. at 45 n.7.
217. See id at 56-57 (Laro, J., concurring).
218. Id. at 57.
219. Id at 54 n.5 (quoting MERTFNS, LAw OF FEDERAL INCoME TAxATiON § 3.20, at
31 (1994)) (alteration in concurring opinion).
220. Brief for Respondent at *8, Redlark v. Comm'r, 106 T.C. 31 (1996) (available in
LEXIS, 95 TNT 252-36) (citing Estate of Wallace v. Comm'r, 965 F.2d 1038, 1050-51
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that "absent any definitive legislative history that is more revealing
(and here there is none), it is proper to give substantial weight to a
General Explanation."" t The Eighth Circuit in Miller III also
"added its voice to those who accept the post-enactment interpretations of the Joint Committee staff as evidence of congressional intent. '' m While the district court in Miller I had effectively ignored the Blue Book because it did not rise to the level of legislative history, the appellate court, citing most of the cases relied
on by the IRS, concluded that it was nevertheless "highly indicative of what Congress did, in fact, intend." 4
In summary, while none of the judges held that the Blue Book
was ambiguous, their conclusions on the proper weight it should be
accorded ranged from "none" to "great." Not surprisingly, the
weight accorded seems dependent on the reviewer's existing conclusions regarding the ambiguity of the statute and Conference
Committee Report. In general, however, all would seem to agree
that statements contained in a Blue Book may be used to clarify
existing legislative intent found elsewhere, but not to establish it

independently or correct it.

n.15 (lth Cir. 1992); McDonald v. Comm'r, 764 F.2d 322, 336 n.25 (5th Cir. 1985))
[hereinafter Brief for Respondent]. The majority had cited Estate of Wallace for the proposition that the Blue Book is to be disregarded if there is no evidence of congressional
intent within the "actual legislative history." Redlark, 106 T.C. at 45.
221. Brief for Respondent, supra note 220, at *8 (citing Bank of Clearwater v. United
States, 7 Cl. Ct. 289, 294 (1985); FPC v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 411 U.S.
458, 472 (1973); Estate of Hutehison v. Comm'r, 765 F.2d 665, 670 (7th Cir. 1985)).
The majority had cited Estate of Hutchison for the proposition that while the Blue Book
was not part of legislative history, it was entitled to respect. See Redlark, 106 T.C. at 45.
222. Mendelson & Conjura, supra note 198, at 353.
223. See Miller 1, 841 F. Supp. at 309 ("Post-enactment explanations such as those prepared by the Joint Committee's staff do not, however, rise to the level of legislative
history in their persuasiveness"). The district court had found the legislative history of the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 "silent on the specific issue of deductibility of deficiency interest derived from business income," and had agreed that "there would be no need for the
word 'generally' if all interest on tax deficiencies is personal interest." Id.
224. Miller III, 65 F.3d at 690 (quoting Estate of Hutchinson, 765 F.2d at 669-70,
citing FPC v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 411 U.S. 458, 472 (1973) (finding that
legislative history is a "compelling contemporary indication" of the effect of a statutory
provision); Estate of Wallace, 965 F.2d at 1050-51 n.15 (legislative history is a "valuable
aid to understanding the statute"); and McDonald v. Comm'r, 764 F.2d 322, 336 n.25
(5th Cir. 1985) (legislative history is "entitled to great respect.").
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E. Subsequent Legislative History
The IRS' final argument regarding legislative history was that
Congress' failure to express dissatisfaction with the temporary
regulation in subsequent legislation was an indication that the regulation was reasonable. The majority agreed that a review of subsequent legislative history is an element of the National Muffler
standard and pertinent to determining the validity of a regulation.
However, it felt that the legislative actions relied on by the IRS
were not of the "type contemplated by the Supreme Court."
The IRS had first argued that Congress' failure to express
dissatisfaction with the regulation in the 1988 amendment of I.R.C.
§ 163(h)(2)(A)' was evidence of the regulation's reasonableness.' In response, the majority suggested that because (1) the
regulation was temporary, (2) the amendment was not intended to
make a substantive change in statutory language, and (3) the
amendment was enacted within 11 months of the issuance of the
regulations, the 1988 amendment was made too soon to have considered the impact of the regulation and would not have included
an expression of dissatisfaction with its per se effect.'
The IRS had also pointed to a Senate Finance Committee proposal included in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990
that would have eliminated the deduction of deficiency interest by
corporate taxpayers. 9 The IRS argued that this was evidence of
subsequent legislative history involving deficiency interest but not
expressing dissatisfaction with the regulation.' Although never
enacted, in explaining the proposal the Committee had stated:
Individuals are not permitted to deduct personal interest.
For this purpose, personal interest includes interest on
225. Redlark, 106 T.C. at 46.
226. The 1988 amendment changed the language of the exception from "interest paid or
accrued on indebtedness incurred or continued in connection with the conduct of a trade
or business" to "interest paid or accrued on indebtedness properly allocable to a trade or
business. Compare LR.C. § 163(h)(2)(A) (as originally enacted in 1986 by § 511(b) of
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, 199 Stat. 2085, 2246) (emphasis added)
with I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(A) (1994) (as amended by § 1005(c)(4) of the Technical and
Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342, 3390) (emphasis
added).
227. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 220, at *6.
228. See Redlark, 106 T.C. at 46.
229. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 220, at *9.
230. See id. (referencing the proposed addition of I.R.C. § 163(k) in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508).
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underpayments of the individual's income taxes, even if all
or a portion of the individual's income is attributable to a
trade or business."'
The majority discounted this evidence as well, noting that it was
only a proposal entered into the Senate record; it was never approved by Congress and apparently was not even reviewed by the
House 2 Finally, the majority explained that the proposal actually
strengthened the case against the validity of the regulation since it
demonstrated that Congress "knew how to restrict the deductibility
of interest if it so intended. 'a 3
While neither dissenting opinion discussed the import of subsequent legislative history, the Eighth Circuit in Miller III apparently
accepted the argument that the 1988 amendment of I.R.C. § 163(h)
was evidence of Congress' tacit approval of the regulation. It cited
its own precedent holding that Congress' failure to change a challenged regulation when amending a relevant statutory provision "is
an indication that Congress did not perceive the regulation to be
unreasonable or inconsistent with Congressional intent."'
It
seems likely that the Ninth Circuit will also recognize this aspect
of National Muffler on appeal." 5 However, it is unclear whether
it will accept the two pieces of legislative history as evidence of
Congress' tacit acquiescence to the regulation.
Ell. PHILOSOPHICAL AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS:
THE IMPLICATIONS OF INVALIDATING
THE TEMPORARY REGULATION

As is evidenced by the preceding discussion of each source of
guidance reviewed by the majority, the Tax Court as a whole
actually agreed about very few of the issues presented in Redlark.
One commentator has noted that when the Tax Court is so divided,
"the 'right' answer may depend more on philosophical leanings
than application of the law." 6 While this is a bit of an overstatement, underlying philosophical leanings undoubtedly played a

231. Brief for Respondent, supra note 220, at *9 (citing 136 CONG. REC. S15711 (daily
ed. Oct. 18, 1990) (statement of Senate Finance Committee)).
232. See Redlark, 106 T.C. at 46.
233. Id. at 46-47.
234. Miller III, 65 F.3d at 690 (quoting Hefti v. Comm'r, 983 F.2d 868, 872 (8th Cir.
1993)).
235. See supra notes 151-153 and accompanying text.
236. Lipton, supra note 10, at 222.
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large part in the Redlark decision and may provide a rationale for
the resulting fractured opinions. For example, beliefs about the role
of textualism and judicial deference, the concept of income taxes
as a nondeductible consumption expenditure, and the relative importance of consistency in the application of tax laws all seem to
underlie some of the divisions among the opinions. Finally, while
the language in Redlark suggests that the application of the exception in I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(A) will be viewed narrowly, some commentators have remarked that the Redlark holding as to deficiencies
arising from a trade or business may also be capable of being
applied to those deficiencies arising from investment and passive
activities.
A. Income Taxes and Related Expenses as
Consumption Expenditures
The majority in Redlark rejected the notion that all individual
income tax is a nondeductible consumption expenditure. The majority believed that the IRS' argument that Temporary Treasury Regulation § 1.163-9T was just an example of the otherwise valid tracing or allocation methodology "proved too much." '
Judge
Tannenwald noted that even if the Redlarks' entire deficiency
clearly related to the trade or business, the application of the regulation would still require that none of the interest be deductible." s To him, then, this was "an unrealistic application of our
tax laws," given the lack of specific legislative intent and the thrust
of pre-1987 case law. 9 At issue is which allocation method better reflects the "overall legislative purpose" of enacting I.R.C. §
163(h)-"to end the deduction for interest incurred to fund consumption expenditures"'4--the majority's, which "looks through"
the total individual tax amount to its components, or the dissents',
which traces back only as far as the tax itself.
Indirect contrast to the majority, Judge Halpern's dissent argued that deficiency interest should be treated as a consumption
expenditure (and therefore nondeductible) because the underlying
237. Id. at 221. See also Redlark, 106 T.C. at 47 ("One final comment. Suppose that
the only income reported on the retuin of petitioners had been Schedule C income ...
and that the entire deficiency related to the type of errors that the courts have previously
concluded were expected to occur in the ordinary course of business. E.g., Polk v.
Comm'r, 31 T.C. 412 (1958).").
238. See Redlark, 106 T.C. at 47.
239. Id
240. l at 42.
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tax deficiency is itself a nondeductible consumption expenditure 41 (Or as Judge Ruwe put it "Interest on a individual's income tax liability represents a personal expense because the underlying tax obligation is personal.") 42 In Judge Halpern's view:
The payment of Federal income taxes is a civic duty, not a
matter of business contract or investment advantage. All
taxpayers, as well as others (citizens and noncitizens) receive benefits on account of the funding of the Federal
Government. The payment of Federal income taxes reduces
a taxpayer's wealth otherwise available for consumption.
Thus, Federal income tax payments exhibit characteristics
not common to business (or investment) expenditures....
If Federal income taxes constitute consumption, and not a
trade, business, or investment expense, then, under a tracing
rule, such as the rule of section 1.163-8T... the inescapable and reasonable conclusion is that any deficiency interest, or interest on a borrowing to pay income taxes, is
personal interest. 243
Further, as noted by Judge Ruwe in dissent:
An individual's income tax liability is based on an amalgamation of income derived from all sources and deductions, credits, exclusions, exemptions, filing status, income
bracket, and other considerations. Income from an unincorporated business is merely one of the many components
necessary to determine what is still in essence a tax on an
individual's personal accessions to wealth from whatever
source derived. 2"
As discussed above, though it may be "wooden," a consideration of all deficiency interest as attributable to consumption does
avoid the inherent ambiguity in the majority's holding (and perhaps
inherent in apportioning such an "amalgamation"). In dissent, Judge
Halpern pointed out that, except for providing support that clear
cases like Miller will not meet the statutory exception, the majority
opinion provides no guidance about what will qualify.245 He notes

241. See id. at 72 (Halpern, J., dissenting).
242. Id. at 60 (Ruwe, J., dissenting).
243. Redlark, 106 T.C. at 71-72 (Halpern, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).

244. 1L at 60 (Ruwe, J., dissenting).
245. L at 75 (Halpern, J., dissenting).
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that it would be "difficult to discern a coherent scheme of interest
allocation" by relying exclusively on Standing, Polk, and Reise.2"
Indeed, the majority's holding seems destined to result in inconsistent treatment by courts and taxpayers, and therefore in increased
judicial inefficiencies.247 Even so, the lack of predictability inherent in the majority's rule is not as troubling as it would be in
other instances because no taxpayers are likely to plan to incur
deficiency interest.2"
On the other hand, concerns about efficiency have not resulted
in per se nondeductibility for other expenses relating to tax deficiencies. For example, following the dissents' logic, tax return
preparation fees and the like should theoretically also be nondeductible since they too are associated with an underlying consumption expense. However, under Revenue Ruling 92-29,249 the IRS
considers litigation expenses and tax preparation fees incurred in
determining state and federal income taxes related to a trade or
business conducted as a sole proprietorship to be deductible in
determining a taxpayer's adjusted gross income ° There is no
compelling reason to treat these expenses differently from interest." If these types of expenses may be apportioned to business
activities in some rational mannerraa it would seem that deficiency interest could be as well.

246. Id. at 74.
247. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing how the majority's reliance
on Polk may be viewed as allowing a certain level of taxpayer "negligence"). If, for
example, taxpayers in certain industries, or with certain levels of sophistication, are treated
differently by courts (or the IRS in practice), issues of inconsistency or "discrimination"
may also be raised. See infra notes 254-67 and accompanying text.
248. Although, theoretically, invalidating the regulation could affect prospective decisions
about settlement agreements (e.g., taxpayers could bargain with agents about what portion
of the total adjustment will be considered attributable to a trade or business).
249. 1992-1 C.B. 20.
250. See Redlark, 106 T.C. at 58 n.7 (Laro, J., concurring) ("Given the Commissioner's
position with respect to these litigation expenses and tax preparation fees, I am unable to
fathom why she continues to believe that the interest on a tax deficiency that is allocable
to a trade or business is not also deductible.").
251. There may be valid policy reasons for encouraging (or at least not discouraging)
taxpayers to incur tax return preparation fees but discouraging taxpayers from incurring
deficiency interest. Further, the Polk court did distinguish between the more "ordinary"
character of return preparation and litigation expenses versus deficiency interest. See supra
notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
252. Of course, the IRS may be more willing to rely on objective evidence in the form
of professional billings that identify time spent on business matters for the apportionment
of tax return preparation fees and the. like.
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The issue of whether a particular expense should be considered
as personal or business-related is not a new one. Much of the
Redlark court's struggle with the principles discussed above seems
due to its indecision regarding this more fundamental issue. As one
commentator noted, Redlark is also "noteworthy" because it involves this issue of the "business versus personal dichotomy that is
the centerpiece of the consumption tax schemes being bandied
about lately."' 3 Based on Redlark, if a consumption-based tax is
adopted taxpayers are in for a bumpy ride unless those schemes
present clearer direction than existing law regarding deficiency
interest.
B. The Importance of Consistency or "Nondiscrimination"
As discussed above, the IRS' current position would seem to
promote the inconsistent treatment of expenses related to income
tax deficiencies. While litigation fees and tax return preparation
fees relating to sole proprietorship deficiencies are deductible, interest is not. Further, while interest is deductible for purposes of
calculating net operating losses, it is not deductible for calculating
adjusted gross income. The fact that the IRS appears to be treating
expenses related to tax deficiencies inconsistently only matters if
(1) there is no rational basis for the distinction, and (2) the IRS
should be held to a duty of consistency. With regard to the latter,
the IRS takes the position that it has no duty to treat even clearly
similarly situated taxpayers consistently, and generally the courts
have accepted this position 4 That is not to say that consistency
does not have a place in a court's analysis of whether an IRS
interpretation is reasonable, however. For example, "[t]he Supreme
Court has indicated, in dictum, that consistency of treatment is an
important consideration in determining whether the Commissioner
has abused his discretion under [I.R.C.] § 7805(b)."'5 Further, in
Rowan Cos. v. United States," the Supreme Court considered
whether the IRS had been consistent in its interpretation of the
statute to be a factor in determining whether the related regulations
7
were valid.'

253. Sheppard, supra note 8, at 641.
254. See Zelenak, supra note 119, at 411.
255. Id. at 421 n.64 (quoting Auto. Club v. Comm'r, 353 U.S. 180, 186 (1957)). I.R.C.
§ 7805(b) concerns the retroactive application of rulings and regulations. See id.
256. 452 U.S. 247 (1981).
257. See Zelenak, supra note 119, at 443 (discussing regulations involving whether employer-provided meals and lodging must be considered wages for FICA and FUTA pur-
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Finally, the Supreme Court, in National Muffler, noted that one
policy served by deference to the IRS in validating interpretive
regulations was ensuring that "like cases will be treated alike. ' sI
While this aspect of National Muffler was not specifically noted in
Redlark, it was perhaps a factor in the majority's recognition of the
apparent discrimination between classes of taxpayers caused by the
regulation. In concluding that the regulation's effective exclusion of
all interest, even in the presence of a clear business connection,
made it unreasonable, the majority noted that "[s]uch a result discriminates against the individual who operates his or her business
as a proprietorship instead of in corporate form where the limitations on the deduction of 'personal interest' would not apply. ' 9
However, Judge Ruwe argued that invalidating the regulation
gives rise to "an even greater disparity in treatment" because deficiency interest would then be deductible by individuals conducting
business as sole proprietorships but not as S corporations or partnerships.' He argued that "[c]onsistent treatment of individual
taxpayers can be best achieved by recognizing that interest on
individual income tax deficiencies is personal interest regardless of
whether the adjustment giving rise to the deficiency pertains to a
proprietorship, a partnership, or an S corporation. '
Judge Ruwe may be correct. However, it does not necessarily
follow that because flow-through entities do not get the deduction,
individuals should not get it either. Judge Ruwe relied on the
Tenth Circuit's holding in True for the proposition that individuals
may not deduct interest related to deficiencies of their businesses
conducted as S corporations and partnerships.' 2 As discussed
above, however, True appears to turn on "aggregate/entity" concepts and not relatedness.' Thus, partnership and S corporationrelated deficiency interest would theoretically still not be deductible
from adjusted gross income under that holding, irrespective of
whether the regulation at issue here was invalidated. Further, it

poses). In Rowan Cos., the Court even included private letter rulings among the evidence
it used to determine whether the IRS' position was consistent. See id. at 444.
258. 1L at 426 (quoting National Muffler v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979)).
259. Redlark 106 T.C. at 40-41.
260. Id.at 60 (Ruwe, J., dissenting) (referring to True v. Comm'r in which the Tenth
Circuit held that interest on pre-1987 tax deficiencies arising from partnerships and S
corporations was not deductible). See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
261. Redlark, 106 T.C. at 60 (Ruwe, J., dissenting).
262. See id.
263. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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may be that True was just wrongly decided. As discussed above,
the holding has the rather anomalous result of denying a deduction
for deficiency interest at both the individual and entity level.'
Also, as the Tax Court noted in Rose, True was an "unpublished
opinion of questionable precedential value."
Finally, Judge Halpern noted in dissent that the majority does
not explain why Congress cannot in fact discriminate between
classes of taxpayers, like corporations and individuals, if it wants
Judge Ruwe also recognized this fact. As he wrote,
to.'
"[s]urely, the majority does not question Congress' authority to
allow corporations, which are treated as separate taxable entities, to
deduct items that individuals may not." 7 Of course, it seems
likely that given the majority's other conclusions, Judge
Tannenwald was not questioning Congress' authority to distinguish
between entities, but rather the IRS' lack of authority to do so via
regulations.
If the situations discussed here are appropriately termed inconsistencies under the National Muffler standard, they should be
considered in whether the IRS' interpretation is reasonable. In this
case, however, the discrimination between taxpayers noted by both
the majority and Judge Ruwe may not be evidence of such inconsistencies. Inconsistent treatment will necessarily result between
either (1) individuals, S corporations, and partnerships versus corporations (if the regulation is validated), or (2) individuals and
corporations versus S corporations and partnerships (if the regulation is invalidated). In either case, there is at least a rational basis
for each distinction. Conversely, however, there does not seem to
be any good reason for the inconsistent treatment of expenses
related to deficiencies and interest, or of deficiency interest in
calculating net operating losses or adjusted gross income, that
results under the temporary regulation.
C. PracticalObservations
Beyond the more technical aspects of the decision presented
above, there are also a few common sense observations that result
from an examination of the opinions. No one could deny that per
se rules in tax law are more efficient. Even though some conces-

264.
265.
266.
267.

See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
Rose, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) I 50,484(M) at 1915 n.4.
See Redlark, 106 T.C. at 75 (Halpern, J., dissenting).
Id. at 60 (Ruwe, J., dissenting).
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sions are made to equity, they result in the predictability needed
for the efficient ordering of taxpayer affairs and greater judicial
economy. For deficiency interest, while the need for predictability
is mitigated, certainly judicial economy is still a concern. However,
as a practical matter, there is little reason for a per se rule of
nondeductibility of interest where other expenses related to tax
deficiencies are deductible and where deficiency interest may be
taken into account in calculating net operating losses. Any incremental judicial economy must be mitigated by these rules allowing
taxpayers to make allocation calculations. Further, even though
cries for equity might be hushed, given the posture of deficiency
interest generally, judicial deference to administrative authority is
not warranted in reviewing a rule that results in a per se rule of
nondeductibility. Similarly, it would also seem that such a per se
rule should be clearly stated within the statute and supported by
more than either equivocal or after-the-fact legislative history. From
such a common sense view, the majority's attempt to maintain an
equitable rule, even at the expense of an efficient one, looks better
all the time.
D. Implications of Redlark for Deficiencies Arising
from Investment or Passive Activities
When I.R.C. § 163(h) was amended in 1988 to substitute the
"properly allocable" language in place of the "in connection with"
language, the stated purpose of the amendment was to "[permit]
consistent application of a standard for allocation of interest."
In addition to the exception for interest properly allocable to a
trade or business discussed here, I.R.C. § 163(h)(2) also contains
specific exceptions for interest allocable to property held for investment and related to passive activities under I.R.C. § 469.'
Therefore, under the holding of Redlark, "it would appear that the
deduction of investment and passive activity interest might at least
have a reasonable basis." 0 Further, as Judge Swift's concurrence

268. Raby & Raby, supra note 8, at 575 (quoting the Conference Committee Report,
supra note 220).
269. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(B) (1994) (regarding investment interest); I.R.C. §

163(h)(2)(C) (1994) (regarding interest taken into account in computing income from a
passive activity of the taxpayer).
270. Raby & Raby, supra note 8, at 575. The authors note that while the language of
those sections is slightly different, "it would seem logical" that the business allocation
reasoning of Redlark (whatever that means in practice) would also apply there. Id. However, if True stands, it would still theoretically bar deductions related to flow-through
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pointed out, Temporary Treasury Regulation § 1.163-8T(c)(3)(ii)
(regarding the allocation of interest when no debt proceeds are
disbursed) includes a provision referring to not only the sale and
use of property, and services, but "for any other purpose" as
well." In addition to deficiency interest arising from trade or
business adjustments, this language could also encompass investment and I.R.C. § 469 activities.2 A specific example of the application of this reasoning might be the deduction of interest paid
under I.R.C. § 453A, which generally requires that taxpayers pay
interest on the "deferred tax liability" arising from certain installment obligations. 3
CONCLUSION

It is difficult to determine whether Redlark is truly a "bird in
the hand" for noncorporate taxpayers. Its survival will largely depend on how a reviewing court integrates the interdependent sources of guidance on statutory interpretation. As proposed here, this
will in turn depend on the reviewing judges' beliefs about more
philosophical issues. For example, in Redlark, whether the statutory
language was deemed ambiguous seemed to depend on whether the
judge accepted the notion that Congress recognizes case law precedents in legislating. Whether the "expenditure method" of regulations generally was reasonable seemed to depend on whether the
judge believed that a consumption expenditure philosophy should
block further examination of the portions of individual tax. And,
coming full circle, the role legislative history should play seemed
largely to depend on whether the judge had already determined that
the statute in question was ambiguous. When differing views about
textualism and the level of deference to be accorded administrative
agencies are added to the mix, predicting the viability of Redlark
becomes an even riskier proposition.

entities. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
271. Redlark, 106 T.C. at 49.
272. See Raby & Raby, supra note 8, at 575. Any related interest deduction will still
be subject to the usual limitations applicable to that section, however. See Jeffrey R.
Davis and Barry R. Friefield, Some Interest on Tax Deficiencies May be Deductible, 52
TAX'N FOR Accr. 196, 199 (1994).
273. See William L. Raby, When Outside Basis Exceeds Inside Basis in the S Corporation, 65 TAX NOTES 107 (1994) (describing the tax-free distribution of installment sale
proceeds from the liquidation of S corporations undertaken in order to minimize capital
losses). Again, however, the limitation in True would theoretically apply in this case.
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Whether it survives or not, the Tax Court's decision in Redlark
is a testament to the complexity inherent in the current tax law. A
reader's initial reaction to the many opinions contained in the
Redlark decision is simply to wonder how taxpayers and practitioners can be expected to consistently interpret what the Tax Court
cannot. Thus, perhaps Redlark will serve as ammunition for the
proponents of comprehensive tax reform, although the business
versus consumption classification issues it raises remain to be addressed in many of the current reform proposals. To the extent that
Redlark can engender reforms that effectively resolve those issues,
it will indeed provide lasting benefit for noncorporate taxpayers.
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